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Introduction
The United States Air Force (USAF) should not attempt to proactively manage the US aerospace industrial base for the purpose of preserving a domestic development and manufacturing capability to produce future generations of US military aircraft weapon systems.
It is the mission of the USAF to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace. While the US defense industry was consolidating, the global marketplace was expanding and aerospace emerged as a major point of international economic competition between the United
States and its largest market competitor, the European Union (EU). The fact that -Washington The commercial market place moves on. It does not wait for defense funding if it is not forthcoming. The surviving aircraft companies now look for opportunities to share costs and manage opportunities within the worldwide economy. For example, Boeing has greatly expanded its use of non-US subcontractors and nontraditional funding. -A Japanese group will provide approximately 35% of the funding for the B-787 design project ($1.6 billion). In return this group will produce a large portion of the aircraft's structure and the wings (this will be the first time that a Boeing commercial product will use a non-US built wing). Alenia of Italy is expected to provide $600 million and produce the rear fuselage of the aircraft.‖ 7
But where does the aerospace defense industry go? The USAF had very few aircraft in development and production in 2008 and the manufacturing lines are dwindling-a situation that seems out of place for a nation that had a robust aerospace industry throughout much of the 20 th century. In this research paper, I examine the perceived relationship between the DoD, the USAF, and the US aerospace industry; and, I answer the question -should the USAF be involved in preserving the US aerospace industrial base?‖ In answering -no,‖ I assert the future of the US aerospace industry is a national issue, not a USAF-unique issue. I also suggest that any action by 
Perspectives from a Recent Presidential Commission
Early in his first term, President George W. Bush established a bipartisan presidential commission to examine the future of the US aerospace industry. 9 To ensure a broad, bipartisan effort, the president only appointed six of the 12-member commission. science and engineering education.
11
The commission had a great deal to say about these topics. After months of meetings and discussions covering the broad spectrum of topics, the commission published its final 300-pluspage report in November 2002. The commission report begins with a positive statement about the US aerospace industry and claims in its opening sentences -the role of aerospace in establishing America's global leadership was incontrovertibly proved in the last century . . .
[and] aerospace will be at the core of America's leadership and strength in the 21st century.‖ 12 However, the report also includes nine recommendations that address many concerns of the aerospace industry and the panel members themselves. The commission identified with great concern several trends it believes must be corrected to both preserve the US aerospace industry and to improve US national security. Most importantly, the commission observed, -The contributions of aerospace to our global leadership have been so successful that it is assumed US economy, but I'm also extremely conscious of the impact of decisions made by our government with taxpayer dollars that undermine our competitiveness for the long run and eliminate jobs and thereby undermine technical skill acquisition in a way that I think will come back to haunt us. So this is something that I take very seriously.‖
20
Senator Clinton did not reveal the motivation for her expression of concern, but it is likely that her thoughts and opinions had been informed by the GAO and the CRS. In an April DoD has taken the position that free market forces generally will guide the restructuring of the defense industrial base. We believe that this is not a realistic strategy for ensuring that government decisions and industry adjustments will result in the industrial and technological capabilities needed to meet future national security requirements. A key reason for this is that defense company officials are understandably concerned with maximizing the returns for investors and are not specifically accountable for how 20 Ibid. 21 Knight and Bolkcom. Air Force Air Refueling, 25 .
the long-term changes in the defense industrial base affect national security.
(emphasis added)
The same GAO report also states -DoD has not taken a strong proactive role in assessing US reliance on foreign sources and foreign investment relating to the defense industrial base. . . .
[and] consequently, DoD generally does not know whether and to what extent it relies on foreign technology and products to meet its critical needs. Such information is necessary to assess national security risks.‖ 23 (emphasis added)
By 1997 the focus of the GAO regarding defense industry consolidation seemed to be evolving from the issue of national security to the risks to competition potentially caused by fewer vendors in the marketplace. In a report titled Defense Industry: Trends in DoD Spending, Industrial Productivity, and Competition, the GAO shifted the discussion from a concern about national security and implied that consolidation in the defense industry is an acceptable outcome resulting from a natural cycle of events. The 1997 report states
The business environment for defense industry has also changed over the years. Since the end of World War II the number of aircraft contractors dropped from 26 to 7 in 1994. . . . The size and nature of the defense industrial base is critically shaped by the amount and emphasis of US defense outlays. Recent debate has centered on the effect of the post-Cold War reduction in defense spending and its effect on the viability of the industrial base. Although this downward trend in budget outlays and particularly in procurement spending is sizable, it is one of four times in postWorld War II history that the industrial base has had to adjust to changes in national security requirements. In historical perspective, defense funding draw downs are not unique.
In 1998 GAO did not address national security concerns at all. In a report titled Defense Industry: Consolidation and Options for Preserving Competition, the entire discussion had 22 GAO Report, Defense Industrial Base, 2. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., 4.
moved to concerns about the potential risk to competition between contractors. For instance, the report states
The sharp decline in spending by DoD since 1985 has resulted in a dramatic consolidation of the defense industry, which is now more concentrated than at any time in more than half a century. As the single customer for many products of the defense industry, DoD must have the ability to identify and address potential harmful effects of mergers and acquisitions. Questions have been raised about whether the consolidation has gone too far-adversely affecting competition in the industry. Many defense industry mergers and acquisitions are recent, so there is little evidence that the increased consolidation has adversely affected current DoD programs. Antitrust reviews have identified some problems, and remedies have been implemented. However, the consolidation could pose future problems unless DoD improves its ability to identify problem areas and devises alternative ways to maintain competition in defense acquisition programs.
Clearly, the tone of the GAO reporting suggests the interest in the US Congress trended toward 
Formal DoD Assessments
DoD assessments of the US defense industrial base evolved and became more sophisticated and nuanced during the George W. Bush administration. Perhaps this increasing level of sophistication reflects a greater level of attention to the subject out of concern for national security, or perhaps it mostly reflects recognition of the subject's political sensitivity. The Department of Defense is a relatively small player in the overall US economy (about 3.75 percent of the gross domestic product) and Department leverage within the overall US manufacturing sector is limited. Many US industries once dominated by DoD demand now are focused on, and dependent on, commercial markets. . . . Nevertheless, it is desirable-and absolutely necessary-that the Department take whatever steps are necessary to ensure the industrial base on which it depends remains sufficiently reliable, innovative, and cost-effective to meet the nation's national defense requirements. The Department is doing so and will continue to do so. Successful acquisition requires a stable environment of trust and confidence between government and an industrial base that is responsive and healthy. This fosters competition for ideas and solutions to efficiently and effectively provide required capabilities and guaranteed best value for the government. Our assessment is that the consolidation of the industrial base, caused by unstable An additional factor the acquisition community struggles with is the Buy American Act. 
Analysis
The fate of the US aerospace industry is a national security issue that should be determined by the president of the United States in partnership with the US Congress. Working together, the president and Congress should decide whether the US government will proactively engage in preservation of the industry or whether free-market forces will be allowed to decide the outcome of this historically critical element of the US economy and defense establishment. The USAF is not the responsible for the future of the US aerospace industry. The USAF is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping a force capable of accomplishing the missions assigned by the president and the secretary of defense. There is no legislative or policy basis for the USAF to attempt to proactively manage the US aerospace industrial base for the purpose of preserving a domestic capability for producing future generations of US military aircraft weapon systems. In the absence of any specific national security policy regarding the defense industrial base, the DoD has decided to allow free-market forces to determine the general fate of the defense industry while preserving the possibility of acting when necessary to protect certain segments of the critical technology infrastructure. In general, these segments are second and third-tier suppliers of subcomponents and raw materials. The DoD has generally decided not to act to preserve domestic US prime contractors.
There is no requirement for additional information about the state of the US aerospace industry and the associated risks of a dwindling industrial infrastructure. These issues have been well documented by many groups-public and private. The important issue is for the senior leadership of the United States-the president of the United States and the US Congress-to deal with the risk assessment and make some critical decisions about how the United States will develop and manufacture aerospace systems while also assuring national security. The DoD is responsible for providing the military instrument of power to the country. It is the responsibility of the president of the United States and the US Congress to determine how best to acquire and sustain the military instrument of power.
Pierre Chao observed in 2008 that the US industrial policy debate is usually focused on the spectrum of sourcing options ranging between global and national markets with the key issue being how to get technology to the US warfighter while preserving US jobs and assuring a source of supply. 60 Unfortunately, this policy dilemma is not well served by the current state of the US military acquisition system because, as Chao also noted that the military is primarily in a sustainment mode now, where costs are increasing to maintain the same capability; but that the heart of the defense industry is earlier in the acquisition cycle during system development where there is more opportunity for competition, new ideas, and profit. 61 So, the defense industry which is considered a candidate for government intervention is not necessarily interested in the current business being offered by DoD anyway. Again, a national security policy decision needs to be 60 Chao, 3. 61 Chao, 5-10. Existing DoD acquisition policies covering the development and production of weapon systems are sufficient to implement the current DoD policy and the de facto national security decision that has been made; and, the government acquisition community can work with whatever elements of the worldwide industrial base choose to participate in the procurement process. Consistent with existing policy, the USAF will provide annual assessments of the status of domestic and foreign sources of supply, which will support a risk assessment that will be 70 integrated into an overall defense capability risk assessment and reported to Congress. When, or if, the president and Congress chose to react to these risk assessments, the USAF will be ready.
Conclusion
The USAF is dependent upon, but is not responsible for-and should not presume responsibility for-the aerospace industrial base that supports it. The USAF should not attempt to proactively manage the US aerospace industrial base for the purpose of preserving a domestic capability of producing future generations of US military aircraft weapon systems. There are well-established policies and procedures for informing the DoD, the US Congress, and the president of the United States when the USAF is concerned that limitations in the aerospace industry might threaten the USAF's ability to execute its mission and thus threaten US national security. The USAF should use these policies and procedures to report the health of the aerospace industrial base when necessary, but it should not make decisions about how to react to the status unilaterally. -A reliable industrial base is one in which suppliers ship contracted products and services on time. Additionally, reliable firms are viable for the long-term. These firms have a stable or expanding business base, earn fair operating margins for owners, and invest in internal research and development, capital equipment, and their workforce such that long-term viability, innovation, and competitiveness is likely. Reliable firms deliver products with integrity that satisfy Department expectations in every respect (free of device tampering, counterfeiting, etc). Finally, a reliable industrial base is one that facilitates innovation by both larger and smaller subsystem providers; allows smaller, subsystem firms to meaningfully compete against larger, vertically-integrated firms; and encourages new firms, commercial competitors, and reliable global suppliers to enter the defense marketplace and compete for defense-related business.
A cost-effective industrial base is one in which suppliers deliver contracted products and services at or below cost targets. A cost-effective industrial base is a competitive industrial base with at least two viable innovative suppliers with strong design teams in mature market areas and a greater number in areas where demand is high and innovation is critical to meet future warfighting, stability operations, and/or humanitarian assistance needs. In addition to the absolute number of suppliers in a given product area, another characteristic of a competitive and cost-effective industrial base is the extent to which suppliers participate in non-defense (dualuse) US markets and export products overseas.
A sufficient industrial base is one in which suppliers deliver contracted products and services that meet Department performance requirements. Suppliers with sufficient industrial capabilities are flexible and react positively and quickly to changing DoD requirements and priorities, particularly during times of conflict-indicative of the adaptability of both production lines and technology. They effectively manage their way through requirements peaks and valleys while maintaining the ability to hire, train, and retain the specialized skills required to meet these dynamic requirements. They also have technology or technology development programs planned and/or in place to meet current and projected DoD needs.‖ 
